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Compensation plan forged within cauldron of politics

Sunday, July 20, 2008

 
The 12-kiloton nuclear bomb Boltzmann is detonated in 1957 in Nevada. Aid for ill nuclear arms workers this year is expected to be $1 billion, less than the $1.4 billion spent annually to maintain the U.S. nuclear stockpile.

Photo by Courtesy of National Nuclear Security Administration

The 12-kiloton nuclear bomb Boltzmann is detonated in 1957 in Nevada. Aid for ill nuclear arms workers this year is expected to be $1 billion, less than the $1.4 billion spent annually to maintain the U.S. nuclear stockpile.

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Richard Miller, a longtime union policy analyst, arrived in a formal Capitol Hill conference room in the summer of 2000 eager to share his ideas.

He had worked for years trying to help sick nuclear weapons workers. Now that the Clinton administration had dramatically reversed the federal government's decades-old policy of fighting workers' claims of job-related illness, it was time to iron out the details of a remedy for past harm.

Miller's idea was simple: Model the new program on one that already existed to compensate sick uranium miners and people who lived downwind of nuclear weapons testing.

The Radiation Exposure Compensation Act needed a few key tweaks but had been sailing along pretty smoothly for a decade. Why reinvent the wheel? Creating a list of diseases that would be presumed linked to workers' jobs — as RECA did — would be the fastest, simplest way to get compensation to the most people, Miller believed.

Dozens of congressional staffers and agency bureaucrats had come to the meeting. The room buzzed with chatter.

On the other side of the shiny, wood conference table was David Michaels, whom Energy Secretary Bill Richardson had picked to handle the growing calls for help from sick weapons workers across the country.

Michaels, as the new assistant secretary of energy for environment, safety and health, was in charge of protecting the workers and neighbors of the nation's vast nuclear weapons complex. He had arrived at the meeting with marching orders from the White House.

Miller was stunned at what Michaels said.

"He said, 'If you're going to use the RECA model, we're going to walk out of the room,'" Miller recounted.

As it turned out, the Clinton administration envisioned a less expensive plan. And Michaels' job was to soothe opposing interests, while still trying to get something on the books.

'I had to keep everyone in line'

Michaels now directs the Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy at George Washington University. In his new book, Doubt is their Product, he calls the law that created the compensation program a "strange beast" with "weird appendages." But that the program even came to be was nothing short of a miracle, he told the Rocky Mountain News.

"The constellation stars fell into place at the right moment," he said.

The White House Office of Management and Budget was concerned about the costs of compensation if a RECA-like model was embraced, Michaels said.

"It was my job to go in there and say OMB says it's too expensive," Michaels said.

Michaels had been on a whirlwind tour of nuclear weapons sites, meeting late into the night with sick workers around the nation. He had helped convince the Clinton White House that a compensation program was the right thing to do.

President Bill Clinton's second term was to end within months, meaning that Michael's job as a political appointee would end, too. In the meantime, the Department of Defense was trying to kill the new bomb workers' compensation plan to avoid facing thousands of its own civilian contract workers with toxic exposures.

"It was very carefully crafted so it didn't affect the Defense Department contractors," Michaels said of the administration plan. "The Justice Department brokered the compromise. We couldn't fight the Defense Department and hope to get the legislation out in that Congress.

"I had to keep everyone in line," Michaels said. "I had sign-off from the Justice Department, the Defense Department — everyone had agreed. Pushing for more meant everything was going to blow up on my end, and I wasn't going to let that happen."

Creative science for standards

Miller got the message.

"If we weren't prepared to split the baby, we wouldn't get anything," Miller said.

One of the committee staffers spoke up about Congressional insistence that picking who got paid had to be based on sound science.

Fine, Miller said. But what if the science didn't exist? The U.S. Department of Energy and its contractors, which ran the nuclear weapons sites, had been known to alter or hide evidence of harm to workers' health. At one site, a contractor had invented a "correction factor" to change radiation dose records that resulted in some workers showing a negative radiation dose.

"That defies the laws of physics," Miller said.

In other cases, workers simply weren't monitored at all or medical understanding was lacking for certain kinds of exposures. How could you base a compensation program on science that didn't exist?

"I knew dose records were inaccurate and incomplete," Michaels said. "And there were also limits to the epidemiological model."

But Congress never would approve giving a hundred thousand dollars to every nuclear weapons worker sick with cancer, Michaels said.

"It would never have passed the laugh test," he said.

The clock was running, and more compromise was coming.

On a Saturday morning a few weeks later, New Mexico Sen. Jeff Bingaman's staffer Bob Simon came to Miller's northwest Washington, D.C., office at the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers Union.

They hashed out a two-part compromise plan: Compensation would be based on the scientific method called dose reconstruction, using the historical records that did exist, to estimate how much radiation workers had absorbed.

But if records weren't good enough, the workers could petition for special status that would give them automatic compensation. Certain cancers would be presumed to be linked to their jobs.

The idea was, if the science was pristine, use it. If not, give the workers the benefit of the doubt for certain diseases.

Whittling down who's covered

The proposed legislation would have given automatic compensation to any worker with incomplete records at any of the weapons sites who had one of 30 kinds of cancer, Miller said. As the compromising continued, eventually the 30 cancers became 22 "radiogenic cancers," suggesting that these were the only cancers that were clearly linked to radiation.

"There is no such thing as radiogenic cancer," Miller said. "Every cancer can be caused by radiation. The 22 radiogenic cancers is a proxy. It's a lousy proxy, frankly, for what we dealt with in the weapons complex."

Special status for every site was whittled down to four sites, which happened to be in the home states of some of the most powerful members of Congress involved in the process. Other sites could petition for the special status.

In all, the compromises cut about $1 billion from the bill's $3 billion price tag.

"The process was brutal," Miller said.

But it didn't stop there. The whittling continued even after the legislation became law in October 2000.

Miller said that much of it came from officials at the U.S. Department of Labor, which oversees the program, and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, which was responsible for the science. NIOSH officials tried to require workers asking for special status to prove that their exposures reached a certain level — a feat that would seem impossible for workers whose exposure records were faulty or didn't exist.

And the idea of basing radiation dose estimates on pristine science alone went out the window, Miller said.

Government scientists at the NIOSH, who were in charge of estimating radiation doses for the program, actually fought some workers' petitions for the special status. The government scientists said they could estimate worker exposures even when records were faulty or missing.

When records are missing for a single worker, they base that worker's estimate on coworkers' records. If records are missing for a whole site, they base those estimates on another site.

"They've spent their careers creating models for each site, out of the ambiguities," Miller said. "This program is providing full employment for them. It's a fat trough."

Both Labor and NIOSH officials declined to be interviewed for this series. But Larry Elliott, a retired NIOSH official who was brought back under contract to oversee the program work, said in a statement, "NIOSH is committed to carrying out our responsibilities under the law diligently and thoughtfully."

 

Ben Ortiz was warned that steps to help his case will backfire

Sunday, July 20, 2008

Ben Ortiz, a former Los Alamos engineer, lays on a hospital bed as he waits to have a non-cancerous procedure done on his enlarged prostate.

Ben Ortiz, a former Los Alamos engineer, lays on a hospital bed as he waits to have a non-cancerous procedure done on his enlarged prostate.

 

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NAMBE, N.M. — There is a saying in Spanish: En boca cerrada, no entran moscas.

Ben Ortiz had not heard it in ages when a government doctor asked him if he knew what it meant. Ortiz, who was seeing the doctor at the top secret Los Alamos nuclear weapons lab because he believed that toxic exposures there had made him sick, knew exactly what it meant:

"It means keep your mouth shut," Ortiz said.

But Ortiz has not.

For 20 years, he has spoken out about sickness that he and fellow Los Alamos workers suffer. Sitting in the home he built at the foothills of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains, he looks out across the valley toward the mesa top where the giant lab still operates.

Ortiz was one of the first workers to speak publicly about the ill workers' plight, testifying to Congress about the need for a compensation program because he thought it was the right thing to do. And he was one of the first to file for compensation after the program was created in 2000.

But Ortiz still has not been fully compensated, even though the federal government has acknowledged that some of his many health problems are work-related.

Ortiz said he believes that speaking out and getting his elected representatives involved has cost him. He said an official at the federal resource center set up to help workers with their claims told him that every time his senator or congressman inquires on his behalf about the delay, it only delays his case further.

Officials at the Denver office of the U.S. Department of Labor, which runs the compensation program, told him that the massive three-ring binder of evidence he had compiled with help from the office of his congressman, Tom Udall, had been lost.

Ortiz, 70, is one of several leading advocates for the ill workers nationwide who have experienced unexplained delays and unexplained mistakes in their compensation claims.

"I don't think it's a coincidence," he said.

Not that Ortiz expected the road to be easy. He had long tried to sound the alarm that toxic exposures at the weapons lab in New Mexico had ruined his health and that of others.

Ortiz had endured humiliation when the Los Alamos doctor and two others blamed his debilitating health problems on age (he was 50 at the time) or his imagination. One even questioned if Ortiz was making himself sick by practicing witchcraft.

"I wasn't going to let those people tell me I was imagining this," he said.

Turns out he wasn't.

Three experts on the health effects of chemical exposure have said that Ortiz's work at the atomic bomb laboratory caused his health problems, which include liver damage, brain damage and blackouts.

Ortiz is losing control of his right hand. His speech and his senses of smell and taste are damaged. He cannot identify the smell of coffee or tell the difference between salt and sugar. Inhaling any chemicals — even auto exhaust — sends him into migraine-like headaches.

Neurotoxicologist Raymond Singer, who has consulted with the Justice Department and FBI, wrote in a report 15 years ago that "Mr. Ortiz was poisoned by solvents and related substances at Los Alamos National Laboratories, causing enduring neurotoxicity and neuropsychological deficits."

Even that was not enough to qualify him for full compensation.

"I was a good employee," Ortiz said of his work as a mechanical technician. He soldered silver and cadmium and worked bare-handed, nearly elbow deep, in vats of chemical solvents. "They shouldn't do this to employees."

 

With a 25-pound liver, Janine Anderson was told she isn't too sick

Sunday, July 20, 2008

 

 
Richard Anderson gives his wife Janine Anderson one of the 32 medications she has to take daily. She lives with Richard in their home in Tennessee, 40 miles from Oak Ridge, the nuclear weapons plant where both of them worked for years.

Photo by Javier Manzano

Richard Anderson gives his wife Janine Anderson one of the 32 medications she has to take daily. She lives with Richard in their home in Tennessee, 40 miles from Oak Ridge, the nuclear weapons plant where both of them worked for years.

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MARYVILLE, Tenn. — Janine Anderson spent seven years as a secretary at the Oak Ridge nuclear reservation, one of the nation's premier nuclear weapons development and production complexes.

But that safe-sounding office position didn't protect her from the toxic exposure that has ravaged her body. Her lungs are scarred with deadly beryllium, a key ingredient in atomic bombs. Her immune system is attacking her body, which harbors an array of heavy metals in toxic quantities. Her liver is so enlarged that it is threatening to burst through her abdominal wall.

She states matter-of-factly that her prognosis is grim.

"Eventually my liver will crowd out my heart, my lungs, everything," she said. "I don't know how much longer I have." She is finding it harder to eat and to breathe.

Anderson helped found the Alliance of Nuclear Workers Advocacy Groups. So far, she has personally helped fellow workers receive more than $2.5 million in compensation from a federal program to aid sick weapons workers.

Many are former co-workers from her administration building. Anderson lists them by disease: brain tumor, leukemia, asbestosis, breast cancer and lung cancer.

"Every single person I worked with except my boss got sick," she said.

But for seven years, the government repeatedly denied most of Anderson's own claim, citing her advocacy work on behalf of others as evidence that she must not be too sick.

Anderson is among several advocates interviewed by the Rocky Mountain News whose claims for compensation have been derailed by the government. The advocates believe that their problems are related to their criticism of the troubled program.

Anderson wonders how and why the program case managers sought out information about her advocacy work, while they failed for so long to take note of the evidence that eventually proved her claim.

In the last few months, the U.S. Labor Department suddenly began approving parts of her claim — a total of 32 medical conditions that they say she suffers because of her job at the bomb factory. They have not explained why those same conditions had been repeatedly rejected for compensation in previous years.

But program officials may have waited too late for Anderson. Her physicians have told her that her liver now weighs more than 25 pounds — a healthy human liver weighs about three pounds.

A series of experts have told her that this condition is inoperable.

Anderson's finances are in a shambles. She and her husband, Richard, have refinanced their home three times in an attempt to meet staggering medical bills.

She worries about how the end will come and what will happen to her husband.

"I'm just trying to get realistic, so it's not such a shock when they tell me they can't do anything," she said. "I want to know if I only have six months or a year to live."